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TONER ON JUDGMENT AND ETERNALISM
Alexander R. Pruss
Patrick Toner has argued that eternalism, the doctrine that all times are onto­
logically on par, conflicts with the Catholic view of judgment as based on the 
state of the soul at death. For, he holds, it is arbitrary that judgment should 
be based on what happened at some particular time, unless, as presentism 
holds, that time is the only that really exists. I shall argue that his argument 
fails because the eternalist can say that judgment is simultaneous with the 
state of soul that is being judged, and there is nothing arbitrary about judging 
something at t on the basis of its state at the same time t.
1. Introduction
In a provocative recent paper,1 Patrick Toner has argued that eternalism, 
the doctrine that all times are ontologically on par, conflicts with the doc­
trine of judgment as understood by Catholics, whereas presentism, the 
doctrine that only present things and events are real, leads to no such 
difficulty. In his argument, Toner distinguishes perdurantism on which 
substances like human persons have temporal parts and are four-dimen­
sional worms, from endurantism on which a substance is fully present 
at whatever time it exists in.2 Toner's argument is initially formulated 
against perdurantist eternalism, and then proceeds to be an argument 
against endurantist eternalism. I shall in the end argue that the argument 
fails because Toner fails to consider a plausible account of judgment, the 
simultaneous punishment account, an account that his own argument ap­
pears to commit him to. But I shall first consider another objection.
2. The State o f  Soul Assum ption
Toner assumes that God judges people not for what they have done, but 
for their state of soul at the time of judgment. Call this the "state of soul 
assumption." The doctrinal basis for this assumption seems to be that, in 
Catholic doctrine, one is damned if and only if one dies in a state of mortal 
sin. However, the state of soul assumption does not follow from the claim 
that judgment is based on whether one dies in mortal sin. For here is a 
model compatible with the claim that God judges us based on whether we 
die in mortal sin but not compatible with the "state of soul assumption": 
God judges people for what they have done and not been forgiven for, 
and damns a person to hell if and only if there is a mortal sin among the 
unforgiven sins.
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Now, someone is in a state of mortal sin if and only if she has culpably 
done a mortal sin and not been forgiven for it. This might be taken as an 
analysis of what it is to be in a state of mortal sin, in which case it turns out 
that the being in a state of mortal sin is not a state of soul, but a historical 
property, and the argument for the state of soul assumption is blocked. 
Alternately, one might simply say that in God's plan of salvation, there 
is a perfect correlation between having one's soul in a state of mortal sin 
and having culpably done an unforgiven mortal sin. If this is true, then a 
person goes to hell if and only if she dies in a particular state of soul, but 
she does not go to hell because of that state of soul. Instead, she goes to hell 
because of the correlate of that state of soul, namely the historical fact of 
having culpably done an unforgiven mortal sin. On such accounts, God 
judges people on the basis of historical facts, and the argument for the state 
of soul assumption is blocked. Moreover, if this is correct, then presentism 
becomes less plausible than eternalism, because if presentism holds, then 
on this view God judges people for non-existent (because past) sins.
3. Sim ultaneous Punishm ent
Toner rejects such historical views of the basis of judgment in favor of the 
state of soul assumption. Nonetheless, even so his argument fails. To see 
that it does, consider the following account of divine punishment. After a 
person dies, God punishes a person at t because the person at t has a soul 
in a state of mortal sin. I will call this the "simultaneous punishment" 
account, in that the punishment is simultaneous with that for which the 
person is being punished.
Now Toner's main argument against eternalism is that "the fact that 
God just picks one moment of [the judged person's] life as his standard 
of judgment seems disturbingly arbitrary" (p. 321). There were infinitely 
many other moments to pick from, and the person may well have done 
things of a radically different sort at them.
But on the simultaneous punishment account, arbitrariness disappears. 
For there is nothing arbitrary about punishing someone at t for her state 
at t. In fact, this is exactly what we would expect if perdurantism were to 
hold: each temporal stage is punished precisely for that temporal stage's 
moral shortfall. But even if endurantism holds, there is no objectionable 
arbitrariness. The fact that all persons are ontologically on par does not 
prohibit me from treating a person differently on account of her relation 
to me, say because she is my wife, as long as that relation is a morally rel­
evant one. The relation between the person treated and the person treating 
is clearly important for many ethical questions. Likewise, that all times 
are ontologically on par does not prohibit one from differentially treating 
events at different times depending on the relation that these times have 
to the time of treatment, as long as that relation is morally significant. And 
identity does seem to be morally significant—it makes sense to treat at t 
events at a time t1 differently when in fact t1 is identical with t . There need 
be nothing objectionably arbitrary about complaining at t about the pain 
one has at t even though one does not in the same way complain at t about 
pains at other times, just as there need be nothing objectionably arbitrary  
about x 's complaining about the pain that x  has in a way different from x 's
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complaint about the pains of other persons (there may be other reasons to 
criticize someone who does not care about the pains of others on par with 
her own).
I do not know whether the simultaneous punishment account is cor­
rect. But I think Toner is committed to it. For it would clearly be problem­
atic on Toner's grounds for a person at t1 to be punished for the state of 
soul she had at an earlier time t0. After all, given presentism, the past is 
unreal, and punishing someone for unreal states of soul is surely unjust. 
Moreover, the same arbitrariness objection that is raised by Toner against 
the eternalist could be raised here against the presentist if the simultane­
ous punishment thesis were denied.
On the simultaneous punishment account, then, there is nothing arbi­
trary for a person at a given time to be punished for her state of soul at the 
same time. This is particularly clear given perdurantism, but is also a de­
fensible claim given endurantism. If this is correct, then Toner's argument 
fails because there is a model that makes Catholic eschatology cohere with 
eternalism, and it is a model that he himself seems to be committed to.
4. Judgm ent
However, one may object that Toner is talking of a doctrine of judgm ent, 
not of punishment. And judgment is once and for all. Judgment happens 
at some specific time t0, and the punishment is done later, not on account 
of the state of soul at that later time, but on account of the judgment's hav­
ing been passed. Now, while it would not be arbitrary to punish someone 
at t0 for her state at t0, it might be argued that given eternalism it is arbi­
trary to sentence someone at t0 for her whole future based merely on her 
state at t0.
Several responses are possible. The first is to say that in fact judgment 
by God can be taken as simultaneous with punishment. It is also Catholic 
teaching, for instance, that the souls of the damned are punished right af­
ter death and even before the universal "Last Judgment," in virtue of their 
"particular judgment." There would be nothing absurd about supposing 
this particular judgment to be simultaneous with the punishment, and to 
continue while the punishment continues, i.e., forever. The Last Judgment, 
then, is the time of a public judgment, where the things hidden are made 
manifest, and where all receive their bodies, ultimately for a life of beati­
tude or a life of suffering. The Last Judgment is then a public judgment 
made in virtue of the state of soul at that time, but the proximate cause of 
the person's punishment at any given time after the Last Judgment might 
be seen as a judgment simultaneous with the punishment.
Furthermore, the simultaneous punishment account allowed one to say 
that w hat one is punished at t for is one's state of soul soul at t, a view to 
which a presentist should be attracted, or maybe even one to which a pre- 
sentist is committed. But one can only be punished for something when 
one has been judged for it (this is a conceptual truth about "punishment"), 
and since it seems inappropriate to judge people for their future states, 
it follows that there must be judgment simultaneous with the on-going 
punishment. Hence the simultaneous punishment account implies a si­
multaneous judgment account.
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Finally one might note that even if we reject the simultaneous judg­
ment account, the eternalist is not in any worse shape than the presentist. 
It may seem unfair to sentence at t someone to hell for her entire future 
in virtue of her state at t. But the apparent unfairness of this seems little 
different from the apparent unfairness of someone now and for the rest of 
her future being in hell in virtue of her having been judged once based on 
what she was like then . The presentist and the perdurantist eternalist have 
the worst of it here. Given presentism, someone suffers for a state that is 
not really her state and due to a non-existent past judgment, while the 
perdurantist eternalist has one temporal slice suffer for the misdeeds of 
another, misdeeds of which that other was judged guilty. The endurantist 
eternalist is a bit better off here, in that she holds that the person suffers 
for her own real misdeeds, but has to explain why it was appropriate for an 
eternal judgment to be made based on a state at a particular time.
I should note that the simultaneous judgment account is quite com­
patible with a view on which further repentance is not possible after one 
dies, say because God allows one to make one's soul to "snap" into a 
permanent shape.
5. Chronos O uketi Estai
Let me end by considering one objection. I have assumed that the suffer­
ing of hell and the joy of heaven are temporal states. Toner's talking of 
judgment being based on "the last temporal part" (p. 319) suggests that 
he may believe that being in hell or heaven are timeless states, so that we 
somehow get taken up into God's timelessness. I am aware that a number 
of Christians believe this, perhaps on the basis of Rev. 10:6 which ends: 
"chronos ouketi estai" ("there will be no more chronos"). However, the Re­
vised Standard Version translates this as "there should be no more delay," 
and the New International Version, New American Bible and New Re­
vised Standard Version all concur in translating chronos as "delay."
Translating chronos as either "delay" or "time" can be made to fit with 
the context: the "delay" reading implies the hastening of events at the time 
of the seventh trumpet call (Rev. 10:7), while the assertion of atemporality 
would fit with verse 7's talk of the "mystery of God" (musterion tou theou), 
though actually I suspect that the "mystery" is not of the Godhead but 
of what God has done for us, hence the reference to the prophets in that 
verse. However, the "delay" reading avoids the apparent self-contradic­
tion of saying that "there will be no more time," which would seem to 
imply a temporal relation between a state outside time and a state in time. 
And would we really want to say of ourselves once we are in the afterlife 
that now  we are timeless but we were in time? The problem is intuitively 
exacerbated for the presentist.
Perhaps, though, the timelessness of the afterlife would consist in the 
last moment of existence being somehow "frozen" into eternity. But it is 
not clear what sense could be made of such "freezing" without commit­
ting oneself to some version of the "river of time" subject to the classic 
criticisms of Donald Williams.3
Furthermore, a view of the afterlife as essentially timeless seems to 
make the idea of the resurrection of the body largely pointless, since all the
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functions of a body as such seem to be temporal in nature. Moreover, even 
a reading of Rev. 10:6 as saying that "time will be no more" can be under­
stood non-literally (and who doubts that the Book of Revelation should 
be understood non-literally at least in part?), as meaning that salvation 
history will be completed, with the succession of significant cataclysmic 
events—creation, flood, choice of Abraham, exodus, exile, return, incarna­
tion, crucifixion, resurrection, sending of the Holy Spirit, and Last Judg­
ment—coming to a close.
That said, even if one sees heaven and hell as timeless states, my argu­
ments seem to work. Judgment and punishment or reward can likewise 
be timeless states, "co-eternal" with the state of soul on whose basis they 
are made. It may be a problem if one thinks that judgment is in time, and 
"then" comes the timeless punishment or reward, but it is not at all clear 
that this is a bigger problem for the eternalist than for the presentist. For 
in the timeless state of being punished, the person is then punished for the 
state she "had" in time. It does not seem that the presentist can allow that 
last temporal state to continue to be real from the point of view of a per­
son "now" outside of time (the quotation marks I am occasionally using 
underscore the metaphysical difficulties of this view). After all, according 
to the presentist, the only time that exists is the present. The person is not 
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